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Noisy Hypotheses in the Age of Discovery Science
Ery Arias-Castro∗
We draw attention to one specific issue raised by Ioannidis [17], that of very many
hypotheses being tested in a given field of investigation. To better isolate the problem
that arises in this (massive) multiple testing scenario, we consider a utopian setting
where the hypotheses are tested with no additional bias. We show that, as the number
of hypotheses being tested becomes much larger than the discoveries to be made, it
becomes impossible to reliably identify true discoveries. This phenomenon, well-known
to statisticians working in the field of multiple testing, puts in jeopardy any naive
pursuit in (pure) discovery science.
1. Introduction
More than ten years ago now, Ioannidis [17] declared that “most published research findings are
false”. If anything, his claim has been corroborated by the empirically observed lack of replicability
in the sciences at large. He provided the following argument to support his claim. Consider an
ideal setting where, in a certain field of scientific investigation, a number of hypotheses are tested.
All tests are assumed to be calibrated at level α and have power 1 − β for the underlying effect.
Let pi1 denote the proportion of false null hypotheses among all the null hypotheses being tested,
that is, the proportion of real discoveries to be made. Ioannidis [17] defines the positive predictive
value (PPV) as the probability that a given rejection is correct, which he derives under the present
setting and obtains
PPV =
(1 − β)pi1
(1 − β)pi1 + α(1 − pi1)
. (1)
The level α is typically set following standard practice (α = 0.05 still being popular in some fields).
The power 1 − β is increasing in α, in the effect size, and in the sample size. The proportion of
false nulls pi1 is a consequence of how the hypotheses to be tested are chosen or formulated, and
thus arises ‘organically’ from the community of researchers interested in the field of expertise under
consideration. From this formula alone Ioannidis [17] derives three corollaries: the first two are
about the fact the PPV is increasing in the power and the third one on the fact that the PPV
is increasing in the proportion of false nulls (pi1). He encapsulates the impact of the latter in the
following statement:
“The greater the number and the lesser the selection of tested relationships
in a scientific field, the less likely the research findings are to be true.”
(2)
This is very easily seen from the fact that
PPV ≥ 1/2 ⇒
pi1
1 − pi1
≥ α. (3)
To ensure that at least half of the claimed discoveries are correct, we see that α needs to be of
order at most pi1 (and this is assuming a power of 1). Thus, if pi1 is (very) small, α needs to be set
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2(very) small, and this presents a problem as it lowers the power. (Remember that the power of a
test is decreasing in the level.)
The parameter pi1 could be called the “probing coefficient”. A large pi1 (close to 1) is indicative
of a field where hypotheses are generated with care, as might have been the case up to a few decades
ago, where data were much more scarce and much more costly to collect and process, and also where
the number of researchers (and perhaps the pressure to publish?) was much more limited. A small
pi1 is evidence that hypotheses are generated (and tested) with abandon, which might be caricatural
of the various ‘omics’, where massive testing is commonplace.
Ioannidis [17] derives the PPV in two other settings: when some form of bias is present and
when multiple labs are pursuing the same question independently in parallel. The corresponding
formulae lead to three additional corollaries: two are about the fact that PPV is decreasing in the
amount of bias and one about the fact that PPV is decreasing in the number of labs performing
the same test in parallel.1 It is generally recognized that bias is an important factor in statistical
analyses, due in part to a general preference for positive results (i.e, rejections).
Our main concern here is in exploring the effect that pi1 has on the PPV and its impact on
the foundations of so-called ‘discovery science’. In the process, we place the PPV in the context of
multiple testing, where it truly belongs, and discuss the issue of distinguishing false from true null
hypotheses in this framework.
In a cartoonish simplification, the discovery science paradigm posits the availability of large
quantities of data and the scientist — now sometimes referred to as a ‘data scientist’ — lets the
data speak for themselves to find meaningful effects. Our message in this paper is that, taken to an
extreme, this paradigm is bound to fail if hypotheses are tested with abandon. Taking a multiple
testing perspective and drawing from the corresponding literature, we offer some arguments in
support of the following statement:
In a field of pure discovery science where very many hypotheses are tested, there is a
risk that false nulls are indistinguishable from true nulls.
We argue our point by showing that, as the number of hypotheses increases, the threshold for
significance needs to become ever closer to 0, making rejection of both true and false null hypotheses
ever harder. This is rather intuitive. Indeed, assuming the null P-values are uniformly distributed
in [0,1] under their respective nulls, and if there are a large number m0 of true null hypotheses,
the k-th largest will be close to k/m0. Qualitatively speaking, the smallest P-values from the true
null hypotheses are ever smaller as their number increases, and the P-values from the false null
hypotheses are ‘competing’ with that. We provide some elements of theory that go beyond this
simple argument.
2. A utopian model for pure discovery science
To emphasize our point we consider what many would deem a utopian setting where, in a given field
of investigation, a number of studies are performed. We assume that each study is preregistered,
conducted exactly as planned, and published without delay. We also suppose that each study is
based on the same sample size, that each study results in a single bonafide P-value,2 that the
sought-after effect size is the same, and that the sample size is large enough to result in sufficient
power. Moreover, in line with a pure discovery science perspective, we further assume that all
studies are, a priori, equally important. We also postulate a fair distribution of resources. Indeed,
1In [17] it is assumed that only the first lab reaching significance gets to publish its result.
2If p denotes the P-value, this typically means that P(p ≤ α) ≤ α for all α ∈ [0,1] under its null hypothesis. Here
we make the simplifying assumption that p is uniformly distributed in [0,1] under its null hypothesis.
3Table 1: The setting we consider versus the real state-of-affairs.
Utopia (our setting) Reality (state-of-affairs)
Each study is preregistered and conducted as
planned
The preregistering of studies is not yet com-
mon practice [6, 22]
Each study is published Publication bias can be important [10]
Each study results in a single test Multiple testing within a single study is com-
mon (and sometimes massive) [9, 23]
Each study results in a bonafide P-value P-values are often approximate or based on
unverifiable assumptions, and can be severely
biased by informal explorations of the data
(data snooping) or flawed by misuse of statis-
tics [12, 26]
Each study is well-powered Studies are routinely underpowered [5]
Each study tests a different hypothesis Multiple labs tackle the same question, pos-
sibly in different variants and using different
tools
Field-wide multiple testing is performed to
identify the most significant studies
Published P-values are rarely considered in a
larger context (except, possibly, in systematic
reviews, but years later)
we imagine the whole field publishing all the results in a single repository and, at the end of each
year (say), performing a meta-analysis of all the results published that year. Since in the present
setting the P-values carry equal weight, the field as a whole allocates the ‘follow up’ budget equally
to further investigate the studies with the most significant P-values. All this is summarized in
Table 1, where we also contrast this setting with the reality of many fields of investigation. Of
course, the field as a whole would also allocate part of its budget to the generation of new data,
new hypotheses, etc, but this will not be of interest here.
In this stylized setting, the sole issue one needs to contend with is the number of hypothesis tests
being performed. We implicitly assume this number is large given that we intend to model a field
that relies heavily on a data-driven discovery paradigm. Therefore, what remains to be done is to
solve the multiple testing problem posed by the very many P-values that are generated. We assume
there are m null hypotheses being tested in the period of interest (we said one year above). We
denote by H1, . . . ,Hm these hypotheses and p1, . . . , pm the resulting P-values. (We leave implicit
the test statistics that generated these P-values.) We let m0 and m1 denote the number of true
and false nulls, respectively, and pi0 =m0/m and pi1 =m1/m their proportions.
3. Two interpretations for the PPV
We start with the PPV and derive it in two ways. The first derivation relies on Bayes’ formula and
is essentially the derivation of Ioannidis [17], although here we offer a frequentist perspective. The
second derivation puts the PPV in the context of multiple testing, where we believe it belongs.
3.1. The derivation of the PPV from Bayes’ formula Ioannidis [17] derives the formula
for the PPV, presented in (1), using Bayes’ formula. We provide some details here not provided in
4the original article. We note that Ioannidis takes a sort of Bayesian perspective when deriving the
PPV, as he (implicitly) assumes that the status of each hypothesis (true or false) is random. We
offer a frequentist perspective instead.
Ioannidis postulates that any P-value not exceeding α is deemed significant (and the correspond-
ing null hypothesis is therefore rejected). Suppose that we pick a P-value at random among the
P-values that were found significant. We ask ourselves the question: what is the probability that
the corresponding null hypothesis is indeed false?
We assume that each P-value is uniformly distributed in [0,1] under its null hypothesis, so that
P(pi ≤ α) = α, when Hi is true. (4)
We also assume that all tests have the same power 1 − β, so that
P(pi ≤ α) = 1 − β, when Hi is false. (5)
Let I be a uniformly distributed index in {1, . . . ,m}. The question we are asking requires the
computation of P(HcI ∣ pI ≤ α) where for each i, Hci indicates that Hi is false. Using Bayes’ formula,
we derive
P(HcI ∣ pI ≤ α) = P(pI ≤ α ∣H
c
I)P(HcI)
P(pI ≤ α ∣HcI)P(HcI) + P(pI ≤ α ∣HI)P(HI) . (6)
Since the proportions of true and false nulls are pi0 and pi1,
P(HI) = pi0 = 1 − pi1, P(HcI) = pi1. (7)
Also, by (4),
P(pI ≤ α ∣HI) = α, (8)
and by (5),
P(pI ≤ α ∣HcI) = 1 − β. (9)
Plugging this into the large fraction above results in the expression (1). Thus, we have established
the following frequentist interpretation of the PPV.
Proposition 1. Assume we are performing a number of tests at level α, all having power 1 − β.
The PPV is the probability that a randomly chosen hypothesis among those rejected is false.
We note that the independence of the P-values was not used.
Remark 1. Although the setting may appear to be stylized, a similar result holds much more
generally. Indeed, suppose that test i is performed at level αi and has power 1 − βi. The reader
is invited to verify that Proposition 1 still holds in this setting, with (1) unchanged but with α
defined as the average level and 1 − β defined as the average power, meaning
α =
1
m
m∑
i=1
αi, 1 − β =
1
m
m∑
i=1
(1 − βi). (10)
3.2. The PPV as one minus the marginal false discovery rate (mFDR) We present
another interpretation of the PPV that puts it in the larger context of multiple testing. It turns
out that the PPV can be interpreted as one minus the marginal false discovery rate (mFDR) [27] of
the naive multiple test that rejects every null hypothesis with a P-value below α — see (12) below.
We provide some background for the reader not already familiar with multiple testing.
5Table 2: Some notation commonly used in multiple testing. All the quantities, except for m,m0,m1
are random and depend on the (implicit) multiple testing procedure in use. In this notation,
pi0 =m0/m is the proportion of true nulls and pi1 =m1/m is the proportion of false nulls.
True Null False Null Total
Rejection V S R
No Rejection U T m −R
Total m0 m1 m
In the particular setting considered here, where the P-values are assumed independent, we may
without loss of generality define a multiple test as a function of the P-values p1, . . . , pm that returns
an index R ⊂ {1, . . . ,m} indicating the hypotheses to be rejected. In formula, the procedure rejects
Hi if i ∈R. Applying a given multiple test results in the situation described in Table 2.
A single test is evaluated based on its probabilities of type I and type II errors, or equivalently,
its size and power. A good test is a test with small size and large power. Analogous measures need
to be considered when evaluating a multiple test: one based on the number of rejected true nulls
and another one based on the number of false nulls rejected (V and S in Table 2). A good multiple
test is a multiple test with small number of rejected true nulls and large number of rejected false
nulls. The mFDR provides a notion of size for multiple tests. Given a multiple test (left implicit)
resulting in the situation of Table 2, it is defined as
mFDR =
E(V )
E(R) . (11)
Ioannidis [17] implicitly considers the α-threshold multiple test, defined by
Rα = {i ∶ pi ≤ α}, (12)
where α is given.
Proposition 2. Assume that each test has power 1 − β at level α. Then
PPV = 1 −mFDR, (13)
where mFDR is the mFDR for the α-threshold multiple test (12).
The proof is straightforward. Indeed, the expected number of rejections is
E(R) =m0α +m1(1 − β), (14)
and the expected number of incorrect rejections is
E(V ) =m0α. (15)
Thus
mFDR =
m0α
m0α +m1(1 − β) = 1 −
pi1(1 − β)
pi0α + pi1(1 − β) , (16)
after dividing by m in the numerator and denominator, and we conclude with the fact that pi0 =
1 − pi1.
64. Optimal multiple testing procedures
The last section gives a multiple testing interpretation of the PPV as one minus the mFDR that
results from using the α-threshold multiple test (12) in a context where the tests have power 1 − β
at level α. We already discussed in (3) some implications for using this multiple test, but now
that we placed the problem in the larger context of multiple testing, one has to wonder if a more
sophisticated approach would improve the situation. Indeed, in our utopian setting, the field as a
whole has all interest in using a good multiple test to decide, in a principled way, which studies are
significant and worth of further investigation.
Surely, there is a large and growing statistical literature on the topic of multiple testing, offering
a number of methods. We refer the reader to some books [7, 9] and some papers surveying the
field [11, 24].
4.1. The family-wise error rate (FWER) The family-wise error rate (FWER) of a given
multiple test is defined as the probability of an incorrect rejection, or in the notation of Table 2,
FWER = P(V ≥ 1). (17)
The α-threshold multiple test is still popular, for example, in genetics. It is discussed in [2]
in the context of genome-wide association studies (GWAS), where α is said to be typically set to
5 × 10−8. The rationale is that a typical study probes on the order of 106 (one million) SNP’s, so
that the threshold is set by Bonferroni’s method (0.05/106 = 5×10−8). This guaranties control of the
FWER in a given study. However, it does not control for the fact that hundreds, if not thousands
of such studies are performed each year.
4.2. The false discovery rate (FDR) For many decades the FWER was the main measure
of size for multiple tests and apparently remains quite popular. However, in contexts where a
large number of tests are performed (large m), controlling the FWER is known to severely limit
the (multiple) power. This lead Benjamini and Hochberg [3] to introduce the false discovery rate
(FDR), which in the notation of Table 2 is defined as
FDR = E( V
max(R,1)) . (18)
This is now a popular notion of size for multiple tests, for example, in genetics [4, 9].
The mFDR is a later variant of the FDR [27]. Although the mFDR is conceptually simpler than
the FDR, the former cannot be properly controlled when all the null hypotheses are true (m0 =m)
while it is still possible to control the latter. That said, they are known to be equivalent under
somewhat mild assumptions when the number of tests is large. Nevertheless, the FDR appears
more popular in practice and we consider control of the FDR in what follows.
4.3. The Benjamini-Hochberg (BH) procedure in the normal means model Table 3
describes the famous procedure of Benjamini and Hochberg [3], known to control the FDR (at a
prescribed γ) when the P-values are independent.3 Note that this multiple test is of threshold type,
meaning of the form
R = {i ∶ pi ≤ τ}. (19)
3The method is also known to control the FDR at the prescribed level under some forms of positive dependence.
7Table 3: The Benjamini and Hochberg [3] (BH) multiple test.
p1, . . . , pm denote the P-values; γ denotes the desired FDR level
1: Order the P-values, obtaining p(1) ≤ ⋯ ≤ p(m).
2: Let sˆ denote the largest s such that p(s) ≤ sγ/m.
3: Reject the nulls corresponding to the sˆ smallest P-values.
For the BH multiple test, the threshold is
τγ = sˆγ/m, where sˆ is defined in Table 3. (20)
Note that it is a function of the P-values.
The normal means model assumes that each test being performed is a Z-test and that any
underlying effect only affects the mean. In detail, we assume that for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, we have
available a Z-ratio Xi and that we reject for large values of Xi. The P-value is computed assuming
that Xi is standard normal underHi, meaning pi = 1−Φ(Xi), where Φ denotes the standard normal
distribution function. We further assume that the model is indeed accurate in that Xi ∼ N(0,1)
under Hi, while Xi ∼ N(µ,1) under Hci , where µ > 0 (since we are rejecting for large values of Xi).
For example, Ingster [16] and Donoho and Jin [8] considered the problem of testing the global null
hypothesis (⋂mi=1Hi) in this setting. Note that in this model pi ∼ Unif(0,1) under Hi, while pi ∼ Fµ
under Hci , where Fµ(u) ∶= 1 −Φ(Φ−1(1 − u) − µ).
In an asymptotic setting where m → ∞ but everything else remains essentially constant, we
have the following consequence of a more general result of Genovese and Wasserman [13]. We first
remark that for any µ > 0 and any λ > 1, there is a unique point u ∈ (0,1) such that Fµ(u) = λu,
which we denote by u(µ,λ). We note that u(µ,λ) is a decreasing function of λ and that u(µ,∞) = 0.
Proposition 3. Consider an asymptotic setting where m → ∞ while pi1 = pi1(m) → pi∞1 ∈ (0,1)
and µ = µ(m) → µ∞ > 0. Then τγ defined in (20) converges in probability to u(µ∞, λ∞) where
λ∞ = 1 + (1 − γ)/γpi∞
1
.
This result implies that, as the proportion of false nulls pi1 becomes negligible (pi1 → 0), the
threshold for the BH multiple test converges to zero (τγ → 0) . The conclusion is thus morally the
same as with the α-threshold multiple test: a small pi1 makes rejection more difficult, that is, if we
use the BH procedure for controlling the FDR.
4.4. Optimality in the normal means model It is possible to study questions of optimality
in the context of multiple testing in the normal means model. For example, Jin and Ke [18] do
this in a more general minimax framework4 that includes the present context. We present here an
alternative, and arguably simpler approach, that based on oracle information [1, 19, 28].
Suppose that an oracle tells us exactly which null hypotheses are false. With that information,
we would just reject precisely these hypotheses. But knowing this does not enlighten the discussion!
Imagine, however, that we are restricted to use a threshold procedure, meaning that the rejection set
needs to be of the form (19). This means that if we reject Hi then we must reject Hj for all j such
that pj ≤ pi. Remember that in our setting there is nothing that distinguishes the null hypotheses
a priori, so doing this is rather natural. The α-threshold multiple test (implicitly considered by
Ioannidis) and the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure are certainly of this form. Now, what is the
4The setting in that paper is that of classification, which is intimately related to the problem of multiple testing.
8best that we can do with this oracle information (i.e., full disclosure) under the constraint that
we must use a threshold procedure? A good candidate is the largest threshold that controls the
false discovery proportion (FDP) at the desired level. For a given multiple test, in the notation of
Table 2,
FDP =
V
max(R,1) , (21)
so that FDR = E(FDP). Let Vt and Rt, and FDPt, denote the corresponding quantities when we
select the P-values not exceeding t. Define the oracle threshold procedure as
τ∗γ =max{t ∶ FDPt ≤ γ}. (22)
(We note that the procedure we consider in [1] is slightly different.)
Following the same arguments leading to Proposition 3, we can derive the asymptotic behavior
of the oracle threshold multiple test.
Proposition 4. In the same setting as Proposition 3, the oracle threshold τ∗γ also converges in
probability to the same limit u(µ∞, λ∞).
Thus the BH procedure achieves the same first-order asymptotic performance as the oracle
procedure. This is true in a setting where the model parameters remain constant as the number of
hypotheses increases. In [1] we consider the situation where the model parameters are allowed to
change with m and arrive at essentially the same conclusion.5
If the oracle procedure is the best we can hope to achieve, then we can conclude, as before, that
in order to control the FDR the threshold for rejection needs to be taken closer and closer to 0
as the number of hypotheses increases. Because of that, there is a real danger that the false nulls
drown in the midst of a large number of true null hypotheses.
5. Discussion
By properly placing the PPV in the context of multiple testing, we provided some additional
theoretical backing to Ioannidis’ claim (2). Perhaps it is no longer just about what each lab does
in its corner; perhaps it also matters what other labs are doing. For if some labs are repeatedly
probing the world more or less at random, without much thought, the hypotheses they test and
the P-values they publish will act as noise and possibly overwhelm the field to a point where it
becomes impossible, at least with statistical methodology alone, to separate the false nulls from
the true nulls.
Field-wide control of false discovery rate? At a higher level, we question whether research can
continue to be done independently by a large number of researchers without some sort of central
decision making on what constitutes important questions. There are some initiatives in this di-
rection [22]. Rosset et al. [25], very recently, proposed a control via access to a large database.
Note that this proposal requires the collection of new samples so that the database is continually
enriched and FDR control remains possible.
Blame it on the P-values? With the bad reputation that P-values are getting and the long-standing
controversy around them [20, 21, 29, 30], one may wonder if all this can also be blamed on them.
For example, one may wonder if the use of Bayes factors [14, 15], or even confidence intervals, would
solve the problem. The answer is a resounding no if, as we consider here, the goal is to identify the
false nulls with some degree of accuracy.
5The BH procedure is likely optimal also in a minimax sense, although this has not been proved.
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